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Abstract. We apply the Infinite-State Model Checking to formally spec-
ify and validate protocol skeletons for distributed systems with asyn-
chronous communication and synchronous access to local data structures.
More precisely, we validate the Redis Pub/Sub key-value Server. Redis
is based on a publish-subscribe architecture used in Cloud Storage and
Internet of Things ecosystems. For the considered protocol, we present a
formal specification that combines ideas coming from round-based and
shared-memory specification languages. The resulting model is validated
via the SMT-based Infinite-state Model Checker Cubicle. In this setting
we use unbounded arrays to model (1) arbitrary collections of publishers
and subscribers, (2) unbounded shared memory used as a communica-
tion media between processes. Our model is validated using the symbolic
backward reachability algorithm implemented in the tool. The peculiar-
ity of the algorithm is that, upon termination, the resulting correctness
proof is guaranteed to hold for every number of process instances.
1 Introduction
Protocols designed to operate in distributed systems are often defined for an
arbitrary number of components interacting via asynchronous communication.
Formal specification languages like Petri nets can be used to model skeletons
and abstractions of this kind of systems. In this setting the coverability decision
problem [1] can be applied to specify potential violations of safety properties
independently from the number of system components. For distributed systems
it is often convenient to consider a generalization of the coverability problem ex-
istentially quantified over an infinite set of initial configurations [7,8]. Existential
coverability has been considered, e.g., in [15,16,17,6,5] to reason about correct-
ness of Broadcast Protocols. For fragments of Broadcast Protocols, (existential)
coverability can be solved algorithmically via the symbolic backward reacha-
bility procedure defined for Well-structured Transition Systems in [3,21]. The
procedure, together with a number of approximations and heuristics, has been
implemented in the SMT-based Infinite-state Model Checker Cubicle [11]. Cubi-
cle provides a specification language that combines both local and global update
rules. The combination is particularly useful when dealing with specification of
the internal behavior of protocols designed for client-server architectures.
In this paper we focus our attention on the application of Cubicle [11] to
formally specify and validate distributed protocols that combine asynchronous
communication and synchronous operations on data structures local to network
nodes. As a case-study, we consider the Redis Pub/Sub key-value Server adopted
in Cloud Storage and Internet of Things eco-systems. Redis Server is based on
a publish-subscribe architecture that can be used to guarantee the consistency
of updates in database systems of microservice architectures. Technically, in the
paper we first present a formal model of the Pub/Sub protocol in the array-based
specification language of Cubicle. Following recent works on verification of heard-
of and round-based models of distributed protocols [9,18,19,20,24,13], we apply
here a combination of round-based and shared-memory specification languages.
Round-based models are quite useful to split complex protocol executions into a
sequence of interconnected phases for which round numbers act as identifiers or
timestamps. Shared-memory models can be used (1) to model synchronization
steps of data structures local to server nodes and (2) to define asynchronous
interaction between client nodes (publishers and subscribers).
Cubicle captures in a natural way the combination of these two types of mod-
els. First of all, it provides declaration of multi-dimensional unbounded arrays.
For instance, the declaration array Sub[proc,proc]; denotes a bidimensional
array in which indexes range over an unbounded set of process identifiers. In
our case study, each row of an unbounded matrix can be used to model a pro-
tocol phase, e.g., the current configuration of a subscriber group. Each cell in
a row can then be used to represent the current state of a subscriber, pub-
lisher, message, and so on. Furthermore, Cubicle transitions can specify both
local and global modifications to groups of array cells. Atomic global updates
are obtained by using universally quantified transitions. Asynchronous updates
can be obtained by splitting a global update in a series of local updates executed
non-deterministically.
The resulting model is validated through the SMT-based verification engine
of Cubicle. Cubicle implements a symbolic backward reachability algorithm in
which sets of configurations are represented via formulas in fragments of First
Order Logic that combine Presburger Arithmetics and the Theory of Arrays
[11,25,4,22]. By construction, the Cubicle verification algorithm ensures that,
upon termination, the resulting correctness proof is guaranteed to hold for any
number of processes. In other words Cubicle can be applied as an automated
engine for solving parameterized verification problems. For our case-study, we
successfully validated different versions of the Redis Pub/Sub protocol and iden-
tify corner cases for the form of transition guards.
The paper is organized as follows. We first introduce our case-study. We then
propose a formalization guided by the above described combination of ideas com-
ing from round-based and shared memory specification models and by functional
requirements of the protocol. We then discuss validation results obtained via the
Cubicle engine. Finally, we discuss related work and address some future research
directions.
Fig. 1. Pub/Sub data structures of Redis
2 The Redis Pub/Sub Server
Redis is a Publish/Subscribe (Pub/Sub) system that can be used as key-value
server. Redis is used in microservice applications to ensure consistency of up-
dates of distributed databases. The underlying publish/subscribe protocol can
indeed be used to propagate local updates to a given key to a set of connected
services. In the original Pub/Sub implementation clients can use three types of
commands: PUBLISH, SUBSCRIBE, and UNSUBSCRIBE. To track subscrip-
tions, Redis uses a global variable pubsub channels which maps channel names
to sets of subscribed client objects. A client object is a virtual image of a TCP-
connected client maintained in the server. When a client submits a SUBSCRIBE
command for a given channel, its client object gets added to the set of clients
for that channel name as shown in Fig. 1. To PUBLISH, Redis looks up the sub-
scribers in the pubsub channels variable, and for each client, it schedules a job to
send the published message to the corresponding client socket. To optimize the
management of connection failures (e.g. clients close their connections), Redis
annotates each client with its set of subscribed channels, and keeps this in sync
with the main pubsub channels structure. This way, instead of iterating over ev-
ery channel, Redis only needs to visit the channels the client was subscribed to.
Fig. 2 illustrates the configuration obtained from Fig. 1 when adding the above
mentioned auxiliary structure. At the implementation level the pubsub channels
is defined as an hash table to optimize key-search and hash table resizing. To
summarize, the algorithm for the PUBLISH and (UN)SUBSCRIBE operations
are informally defined as follows.
– To PUBLISH, hash the channel name to get a hash chain. Iterate over the
hash chain, comparing each channel name to our target channel name. Once
Fig. 2. Optimized Pub/Sub data structures of Redis
the target channel name is found, get the corresponding list of clients. Iterate
over the linked list of clients, sending the published message to each client.
– To SUBSCRIBE, find the linked list of clients as before. Append the new
client to the end of the linked list (constant time). Also, add the channel to
the client’s hash table (constant time).
– To UNSUBSCRIBE, find the linked list of clients for the channel, as before.
Then iterate over the entire list and remove the client.
Further optimizations are related to lazy resizing strategies of hash tables and
bit-level representation of hash tables and channel names. We do not describe
these features here and focus instead on the protocol skeleton used in the Redis
server.
3 Formal Specification of the Redis Pub/Sub Server
To model the Redis architecture and extract correctness requirements, we will
first focus on some peculiarities and properties of the underlying Pub/Sub pro-
tocol. First of all, we remark that the object manipulated in the Server data
structures represent TCP client connections. A TCP connection can be viewed
as a perfect channel in which messages are delivered in the same order as they
are sent. Under this assumption, we can restrict ourselves to failures due to net-
work connections drops or to explicit client disconnections. Furthermore, we will
assume that (1) the Redis implementation ensures the synchronization between
the different data structures maintained in the server, (2) each data structure
(e.g. pubsub channel) is maintained consistent via standard concurrency con-
trol abstractions (concurrent data structures, synchronized blocks, etc). These
assumptions allows us to focus on a model with two different layers: (1) a syn-
chronous layer used to model updates of the data structure maintained by the
Redis server. (2) an asynchronous layer used to model responses. More precisely,
subscribe requests will be modeled via synchronous updates of an abstraction of
the pubsub channel data structure, whereas publish requests will be modeled in
two phases: a synchronous step used to update the server data structures and
and asynchronous one used to send notifications to subscribers.
Another important observation is related to the expected behavior of the
Pub/Sub protocol. Subscribe and unsubscribe requests can be submitted any
time to a Redis server. Thus, at least in principle, it is impossible to guaran-
tee that, for a fixed topic, a given update will reach all subscribers that are in
the pubsub channel during the completion of a publish request. For instance,
a subscriber can join the server right after the update has been distributed to
all TCP connection objects but before it is actually received by all clients, an
unsubscribe request can be received by the server before the completion of the
publish request of another client, a TCP connection might drop during the pro-
tocol execution, etc. To model the above mentioned scenarios, it is convenient
to adopt a round-based view of the protocol behavior. In each round we use a
shared memory model to specify the current state of the pubsub channel. More
specifically, we use two unbounded arrays Sub and Msg, indexed on round and
process indentifiers, to model: (1) the state of subscribers in different rounds
of the protocol, and (2) messages waiting to be delivered to subscribers in that
round. Notice that each row of the two matrices is associated to a distinct round.
A round consists of synchronous steps in which either a (non deterministically
selected) subscriber joins a group associated to a given topic or a publisher pre-
pares the message to be sent to the current set of subscribers. The asynchronous
phase of a round consists in the distribution of notifications to the subscriber
group. Rounds are used here as a conceptual tool to model different phases of
the protocol. In real execution traces several phases may overlap. Following the
methodology discussed in [9,18,19,20], overlappings can be eliminated by using
permutation schemes (e.g. left and right movers). To model the dynamics of
subscribers groups, we operate as follows. Subscribers can non-deterministically
create new groups by selecting a round number for which there are no pend-
ing messages prepared by publishers. As soon as a publisher associates to that
round number a given message object (preparation of the notification phase),
new subscribers need to create new groups using a fresh round identifier. The
interesting point of a round-based model of the protocol is that the same idea
can be applied to model network failures and reconfigurations. Indeed anytime
any configuration of a subscriber group can be generated by selecting a fresh
round identifiers and discharging the previous one. In other words for any pos-
sible real protocol executions we can rearrange protocol and group formation
steps in order to define a sequence of rounds with the same groups and the same
set of notifications. For instance, an execution in which several messages are sent
to the same subscribers can be mimicked by a sequence of rounds in which a
single message is sent to every subscriber and so on.
We do not consider here any order between round identifiers. The reason is
that we rely on TCP connections for maintaining the order between a sequence
of updates sent by the same publisher. However our goal is to show the cor-
respondence between updates sent by a publisher and received by a subscriber
within the same round. To ensure this property, we need to ensure freshness
of every newly created subscriber group, and ensure that object preparation is
done synchronously (or using some form of serialization step).
In our model we apply some additional abstractions. Firstly, we focus on
a single channel name (topic), assuming that the synchronization of the data
structure associating clients to topics and topics to clients are done correctly
in the protocol implementation of the Redis server Secondly, we consider only
notifications with two possible values, namely One and Two, since we two values
are enough to show a possible inconsistency between a publisher and a subscriber
view of the same update.
Figure 3 summarizes the intuition of the model that we will formally specify
using Cubicle’s input language in the rest of the section.
Array Variables
We first define types and array variables to model publishers, subscribers, and
pending object messages in different rounds.
type pstate = Idle | Busy | One | Two
type sstate = SIdle | SOne | STwo
type mstate = Null | MOne | MTwo
array Pub[proc] : pstate
array P[proc,proc] : pstate
array S[proc,proc] : sstate
array Sub[proc,proc] : bool
array Msg[proc,proc] : mstate
More specifically, the interpretation of the declared data structures is as follows:
– pstate defines the publisher state,
– sstase defines the subscriber state,
– mstate is used to model the state of the shared-memory,
– Pub models the state of publishers: Pub[n] is initially Idle and it is set to
Busy after the selection of a round number.
– P models the state of publishers after the selection of a round number, i.e.,
Pub[t,n]=One [resp. Two] means that, in round t, n has chosen to send One
[resp. Two].
– Sub models a subscriber group in a specific round, i.e., Sub[t, p] = True if,
in round t, p belongs to the subscriber group.
– S models the state of subscribers after the selection of round numbers.
– finally, Msg models the flow of messages from publishers to subscribers, i.e.,
Msg[t,p] identifies a message that, in round t, has to be delivered to sub-
scriber p.
Fig. 3. Round-based model for publishers and subscribers: each rows denotes a different
state of the pubsub channel global variable.
Initial Configuration
The initial configuration is defined via the following Cubicle statement.
init (t n) {
Pub[n] = Idle &&
P[t,n] = Idle &&
S[t,n] = SIdle &&
Sub[t,n] = False &&
Msg[t,n] = Null
}
The above statement must be interpreted as a conjunctive formula universally
quantified over t and n. In other words in the initial configuration Pub,P and S
are in idle state, there are no subscription groups and no message objects.
Subscribe
The first transitions specifies the subscription step of a given client.
transition subscribe(t n)
requires {
Msg[t,n] = Null &&
Msg[t,t] = Null &&





For a subscriber to join a group at round t, the rule requires the absence of
message objects in the same round. Since the initial configuration does not put
any constraint on groups, any subscriber group can be generated by using this
rule until a given round identifier t remains fresh.
Publish
The second transition combines an asynchronous request done by a publisher
with a synchronous step done by the Redis server in order to prepare message
objects for every subscriber of the current round.
transition publish1(t n)
requires {
Pub[n] = Idle &&
Msg[t,n] = Null &&
Msg[t,t] = Null &&






| p=t && q=n : MOne
| p=t && Sub[t,q]=True : MOne
| _ : Msg[p,q];
}
In this rule a publisher with identifier n selects a fresh round number (in which
subscribers could have formed a group with arbitrary shape) and then prepares
message objects for every subscriber associated to that round number.
The first case p=t && q=n : MOne of the update rule is used to insert at least
a MOne message in the current round (in case there are no other subscribers).
The second case p=t && Sub[t,q]=True : MOne assigns the state MOne to the
message object of every subscriber. The state of the message objects of other
rounds or other indexes remains unchanged.
The following rule is used to select value Two and assign state MTwo to
message objects.
transition publish2(t n )
requires {
Pub[n] = Idle &&
Msg[t,n] = Null &&
Msg[t,t] = Null &&






| p=t && q=n : MTwo
| p=t && Sub[p,q]=True : MTwo
| _ : Msg[p,q];
}
The combined effect of the previous rules is that of storing the type of notifi-
cation (One or Two), in a non-deterministically chosen, unused round identifier t,
and of initializing the state of every cell 〈t, q〉 (current round t, subscriber q) of
the Msg matrix with the corresponding states (MOne for One and MTwo for Two).
Finally, we assume that publishers can reset their state and return to the









We now come to the definition of the notification phase. Notifications are gen-
erated by non-deterministically delivering message objects to subscribers.
ttransition notify1(t n)
requires {














The subscriber state S stores in a local state the value of the received message
for the current round number.
4 Validation through Cubicle
Our correctness requirement must necessarily be formulated with respect to a
given round. More specifically, we would like to show that only when a subscriber
group remains stable for a long enough period (that we identify as a round),
then every notification sent by the publisher will be received by every subscriber
in the group. This kind of property is similar to correctness criteria used in
consensus protocols like Paxos. Under this hypothesis, unsafe configurations can
be specified using the following judgements adopted by Cubicle to specify bad
configurations:
unsafe (t m n) {
P[t,m] = One && S[t,n] = STwo
}
unsafe (t m n) {
P[t,m] = Two && S[t,n] = SOne
}
unsafe (t n) {
P[t,n] = Two && S[t,n] = SOne
}
unsafe (t n) {
P[t,n] = One && S[t,n] = STwo
}
}
Cubicle interprets this kind of formulas as existentially quantified over the pa-
rameter names. Therefore, the judgements specify configurations in which, through
the shared-memory model of subscription and message objects, values read by
subscribers are different from those published by publishers in the same round.
5 Cubicle Engine at Work
The Cubicle verification engine is based on symbolic backward exploration. Cu-
bicle operates over sets of existentially quantified formulas called cubes. The
search procedure maintains a set V and a priority queue Q resp. of visited and
unvisited cubes. Initially, let V be empty and let Q contain the cubes repre-
senting bad states. At each iteration, the procedure selects the highest-priority
cube Φ from Q and checks for intersection with the formula denoting the initial
configurations (satisfiability of conjunction of Φ and formulas in the initial con-
ditions). If the test fails, it terminates reporting a possibile error trace. If the
test passes, the procedure proceeds to the subsumption check, i.e., implication
between formulas. If subsumption fails, then add Φ to V , compute all cubes in
predt (for every t), add them to Q, and move on to the next iteration. If the
subsumption check succeeds, then drop Φ from consideration and move on. The
algorithm terminates when a safety check fails or Q becomes empty. When an
unsafe cube is found, Cubicle actually produces a counterexample trace.
Formulas containing universally quantified formulas (generated during the
computation of predecessors) are over-approximated by existentially quantified
formulas. In presence of universally quantified guards the class of formulas ma-
nipulated by the backward reachability loop of Cubicle in not closed under pre-
image. To handle such formulas, Cubicle implements a safe but over-approximate
pre-image computation. Given a cube ∃ī.Φ and a guard G of the form ∀j̄.Ψ(j̄),
the pre-image replaces G by the conjunction
∧
σ∈Σ(j̄,̄i) Ψ(j̄)σ of instances over
the permutation of Σ(j̄, ī). In other words, in order to handle universally quanti-
fied guards, Cubicle applies a declarative (and syntactic) version of the monotone
abstraction introduced in [2]. Safety checks, being ground satisfiability queries,
are easy for SMT solvers. The challenge is in the subsumption check because
of their size and the existential implies existential logical form. Cubicle applies
the heuristics described in [11] to handle subsumption. The BRAB algorithm,
introduced in [12], automatically computes over-approximations of backward
reachable states that are checked to be unreachable in a finite instance of the
system using the Murφ model checker. The resulting approximations (candi-
date invariants) are model checked together with the original safety properties.
Completeness of the approach is ensured by a mechanism for backtracking on
spurious traces introduced by too coarse approximations.
5.1 Pub/Sub Protocol Validation
When applying Cubicle to our formal model of the Redis Pub/Sub protocol en-
riched with judgments expressing bad configurations, the tool proves the model
correct in few seconds. More specifically, Cubicle visits 20 nodes with at most 3
process indexes, 970 fixpoint checks, and 806 calls to the Alt-Ergo SMT solver.
Since Cubicle operates over unbounded arrays, the above result provides a cor-
rectness proof of the considered model for any number of publishers and sub-
scribers. The proof certificate can be obtained by taking the (negation of the)
set of assertions (formulas) collected during the fixpoint computation. When
Model dfs brab V F S M D I C
Redis 20 970 806 3 0 0 Yes
”
√
20 962 820 3 0 0 Yes
”
√
(2) 12 518 291 3 0 6 Yes
”
√
(3) 12 520 301 3 0 8 Yes
Redis1 20 970 806 3 0 0 No
Fig. 4. Experimental results: V=visited nodes, F=fixpoint tests, S=solver calls,
M=max process number, D=deleted node, I=number of invariants (brab),
C=property checked (Yes/No).
invoked using the BRAB algorithm with parameter 2 the tool infers 6 invari-
ants that reduce the visited nodes to 12, the fixpoint checks to 518, and the
number of calls to the solver to 291. The execution time remains unchainged.
When invoked using the BRAB algorithm with parameter 3 the tool infers 8
invariants at the cost of a significant increase of the execution time. The table
in Fig. 4 summarizes the results obtained with the different heuristics provided
by Cubicle. In Fig. 4, in order to check robustness, we also consider variations,
as such as Redis1, of the above discussed model. Redis1 is obtained by remov-
ing from the publisher rules the the first case in the Msg update action, namely
| p=t && q=n : MOne in publish1 and | p=t && q=n : MTwo in publish2.
When validated in Cubicle, this modification leads to the following error trace
(in the Cubicle output notation):
pub1(#1,#2)->Sub(#1, #3)->pub2(#1,#3)->notify2(#1,#3)->unsafe[1].
In the trace we can find two phases (rounds) that are not separated via distinct
identifiers. This leads to the following undesired behaviour: a publisher sends a
message, say One, when no subscriber is registered to the considered topic, yet.
As a consequence no message object is inserted in the shared-memory (Redis
server data structure). Subscribers can then re-use the same round number and,
in the second part of the session, join the group before a second message of type
Two is brodcast to the subscriber group. The guard in the update rule forbids
this behavior by marking the round after the first publish message as used. This
way, we enforce the correspondence between round numbers and protocol phases.
6 Related Work and Conclusions
We have presented an application of the SMT-based Infinite-state Model Checker
Cubicle to the verification of a parameterized model of the Pub/Sub architecture
implemented in the Redis server. The formal specification is based on the com-
bination of a round-based interpretation of the protocol behavior with a shared
memory representation of the updates to its internal data structures. This work
is strictly related, although applied in a different class of protocols, with our
recent work on the application of logic-based declarative methods for the veri-
fication of distributed systems [14,10]. More specifically, in [14,10] we proposed
to apply a logic-based language called GLog and Cubicle [11,23] as a declarative
verification framework for distributed systems. GLog is based on a quantified
predicate logic in a finite relational signature with no function symbols. Config-
urations are represented as sets of ground atomic formulas (instances of unary
and binary predicates). Update rules consist of a guard and two sets of first
order predicates that define resp. deletion and addition of state components.
Rules can be applied to update a global configuration component by component
and to test global conditions on the vicinity of a node by restricting updates
to given predicates. Termination of an update subprotocol can then be checked
via a global condition. Similar specification patterns have been applied to model
non-atomic consistency protocol and mutual exclusion protocols with non-atomic
global conditions. GLog has been applied to manually analyze distributed proto-
cols in [14]. Cubicle [11,23], an SMT-based infinite-state model checker based on
work by Ghilardi et al. [4], can be applied as an automated verification engine for
existentially quantified coverability queries in GLog. In Cubicle parameterized
systems can be specified as unbounded arrays in which individual components
can be referred to via an array index. The Cubicle verification engine performs a
symbolic backward reachability analysis using an SMT solver for computing in-
termediate steps (preimage computation, entailment and termination test) and
applies overapproximates predecessors using upward closed sets as in monotone
abstractions [2]. A peculiar feature of Cubicle w.r.t. MCMT [4] is that the tool
can handle unbounded matrices. This is particularly relevant when modeling
topology-sensitive protocols as done in GLog using binary relations defined over
component identifiers. Furthermore, existentially quantified coverability decision
problems can be mapped into Cubicle. Indeed, classes of initial configurations are
specified by using partial specifications of initial configurations in Cubicle verifi-
cation judgements. Infinite sets of bad configurations can be expressed as unsafe
configurations in Cubicle verification judgements. We believe that the proposed
methodology (array-based specifications of round-based protocols with complex
local data structures, verification via symbolic exploration) is applicable to other
classes of distributed systems such as consensus protocols or protocols that use
consensus protocols as building blocks (e.g. distributed objects/ledgers).
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